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More choice has emerged as a politically palatable alternative to funda-
mental health care reform in the United States. After the 1980s brought
explosive increases in the cost of providing coverage to employees, the
elderly, and the indigent, there was widespread anticipation of some gov-
ernmental reform of the health care market. Even before it became clear
that such reform would not materialize, however, and with increasing mo-
mentum afterwards, ﬁrms sought to induce their employees to choose al-
ternatives to the traditional fee-for-service plans that presented the in-
sured, their providers, or both with better incentives to control costs.
The incentives oﬀered by ﬁrms to accept these new alternatives have
typically included expanded coverage and lower monthly premiums col-
lected in the form of payroll deductions. So many employees now choose
between a traditional fee-for-service plan with cost sharing and compara-
tively high payroll deductions, and one or more health maintenance organ-
izations (HMOs) with no cost sharing and dramatically lower monthly
payroll deductions. The HMOs use administrative or supply-side mecha-
nisms to control the costs of providing care; they have even sought to en-
tice workers in the automobile industry who are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement that provides for health care without coinsurance or
payroll deductions. The airwaves in Michigan are full of advertisements
fromtheseHMOsarguingthattheybestthetraditionalfee-for-serviceplans
noto nly on price, which is irrelevant for this population, but also on qual-
ity control and on the speed and eﬃciency with which they provide care.
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249Thef e deral government, too, has seized on choice as a means to lower
health care costs. The Medicare program has allowed a number of HMOs
to sign up the elderly. In return for accepting administrative controls over
provision of services, the elderly are oﬀered an expanded basket of ser-
vices, typically including such things as pharmaceuticals and well-care,
and freedom from the bother of applying and then waiting for reimburse-
ment from the Medicare system. As in the case of the automobile workers,
the campaign to sign up this group has taken to the airwaves with commer-
cial messages touting the advantages of each plan while showing pictures
of happy, healthy senior citizens engaging in various outdoor activities.
While HMOs have been in the forefront of the health care reform move-
ment, other alternatives to traditional fee-for-service coverage have also
emerged. The Health Insurance Access and Portability Act of 1996,
known also as the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill, authorizes a limited trial of
catastrophic insurance. Instead of seeking to implement cost control
through administrative mechanisms and essentially eliminating coinsur-
ance, catastrophic insurance makes individuals behave as if they are
spending their own money by, in most cases, forcing them to spend their
own money.T op rovide the necessary liquidity to satisfy deductibles, which
might be several thousand dollars, the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill also pro-
vides for a tax-favored savings account from which expenditures below the
levelo fthe deductible may be paid. This eliminates the tax advantages of
low-deductible, high-premium insurance plans.
Under such systems, the issue of how individuals make choices about
insurance is a critical one. There are two fundamental questions, the an-
swers to which will determine the long-term prospects of a system incorpo-
ratingah igh degree of choice among insurance alternatives. First, adverse
selection of sicker individuals into the more generous coverage options is
of concern. The initial estimates of cost saving from managed care and
other alternative arrangements surely is due at least in part to the fact that
these schemes attract the healthiest segments of the covered population.
There is reason to suspect, therefore, that the cost savings will disappear
or at least diminish as the number of people, and the number of compara-
tively unhealthy people in particular, covered under the new alternatives
increases. Equally important is the responsiveness of employees to the
pricing of the various insurance options. For example, how much lower
must premiums be before large numbers of covered individuals will accept
greater levels of risk bearing.
This paper describes the choices made by employees of a ﬁrm that oﬀers
three diﬀerent insurance options, which diﬀer both in their generosity and
their costs to the employee. Section 8.1 describes the claims data used in
this analysis. Section 8.2 examines the options elected by employees when
their ﬁrms shifted from oﬀering what was essentially a single plan to the
menu of three plans. Section 8.3 considers the relative prices of the diﬀer-
250 Matthew J. Eichnerentc overage options. Section 8.4 focuses on the apparent willingness of
employees to bear greater risk in return for paying less for insurance. Sec-
tion 8.5 describes the group of those employees who, after selecting initial
coverage options, reconsider their choices and transfer into other plans.
Section 8.6 concludes.
8.1 Claims Data
Thed atau sed in the following analysis consist of conﬁdential MedStat
claims records representing all expenditures incurred by a group of 16,930
ﬁrm employees and their dependents during the years 1989 through 1992.
Each record represents a speciﬁc claim for a speciﬁc service on a speciﬁc
date and indicates the identity of the individual receiving the service, the
household to which he or she belongs, the plan under which the patient is
covered, the diagnosis, the type of service, and the billed cost of care ren-
dered. Basic demographic information, including the patient’s age, gender,
and location, is also included as part of each claim record. Claims data
have an attractive property, in that individual plan enrollees are motivated
to report every claim. At the same time, the ﬁrm paying the bill has an in-
centive to make sure that only legitimate claims are ﬁled.
Two potential diﬃculties with the use of claims data must be addressed.
First, only individuals who ﬁle claims are observed in the data. Aside from
claims, there is no independent record of employment. Thus if an individ-
ual consumed no medical care during the three years of data available for
each ﬁrm, he or she is invisible to the analysis described in this paper. This
is not likely to be a large problem. Few individuals are so fortunate as to
live three years without seeing a doctor either forp reventive care or to
address an acute condition. Figure 8.1 provides some descriptive evidence
supporting this view. While large numbers of families appear in 1989 and
1990, by 1992 the new arrivals have slowed to a trickle. In a similar vein,
the departure of an individual who leaves the ﬁrm during the three years
covered by the data will not be detected. In this case, restricting the sample
to employees aged twenty-ﬁve through ﬁfty-ﬁve largely avoids the poten-
tial problem of retirees’ vanishing from the panel.
As econdc oncern involves the underreporting of claims that fall below
the deductibles that apply to the various plans. Such behavior might result
from individuals’ believing that they would not, even with the claim, satisfy
their annual deductibles. A signiﬁcant degree of nonreporting would pro-
duce a discontinuity in the distribution of claims around the deductible.
As shown in appendix ﬁgure 8A.1, on which the relevant deductible is
indicated by a horizontal line, no such discontinuity is in fact present.
Beginning in 1990, the ﬁrm oﬀers its employees a choice among three
insurance plans with varying levels of premiums and beneﬁts. Plan 1 fea-
tures a comparatively high deductible and copayment percentage, while











































rthe provisions of plan 2 are typical of traditional fee-for-service options.
Plan 3, with an individual annual deductible of only $125 and a copayment
of 10 percent, is an option with particularly generous beneﬁts. The exact
provisions of each plan, for individual enrollees and employees with cov-
ered dependents, are shown in table 8.1. The table completely describes all
diﬀerencesa mong the three plans. Utilization review procedures for cer-
tain high-cost treatments and “carve-outs” for mental health, substance
abuse, eyeglasses, and prescription drugs are the same across the three
plans.
8.2 Initial Choice of Plan
At the start of 1990, the salaried employees of a Fortune 500 ﬁrm were
required to elect new insurance coverage from a menu of three plans with
varying employee contribution and reimbursement levels. Previously, all
employees had essentially been covered under a single plan. In this section,
Id escribe the characteristics of the employees who chose each of these op-
tions.
Theb asic demographics of those choosing each plan are shown in table
8.2. Somewhat surprising is the fact that the proportion of employees aged
forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-ﬁve choosing plan 1, the high-deductible option, is actu-
ally greater than the proportion of employees in the younger age groups.
Table 8.2 Demographic Characteristics by New Plan Chosen
Plan 1 (%) Plan 2 (%) Plan 3 (%)
Employee age
25–34 Years 10.68 41.82 47.50
35–44 Years 13.16 39.32 47.51
45–55 Years 15.10 41.39 43.51
Employee gender
Male 13.90 41.06 45.04
Female 10.83 40.73 48.44
Source: See table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Plans Oﬀered
Deductible ($) Copayment (%) Out-of-Pocket Limit ($)
Individual Family Individual Family Individual Family
Plan 1 1,000 2,000 30 30 2,500 5,000
Plan 2 250 500 20 20 1,500 3,000
Plan 3 125 250 10 10 1,000 2,000
Source: Author’s calculations from conﬁdential MedStat claims data.
Choice among Employer-Provided Insurance Plans 253Ap ossiblee x planation may be that older employees tend to have higher
asset balances, making the prospect of paying a deductible of $2,000 out
of pocket during a year less daunting. Female employees are, on the whole,
less likely to choose the high-deductible option. Enrollment in what the
ﬁrm views as the base option, plan 2, remains at about 40 percent across
all of the demographic groups. Table 8.3 shows the breakdown of enroll-
ment decisions by family structure. Not surprisingly, those without fami-
lies seem more likely to choose the high-deductible plan 1. As family size
increases, the likelihood of electing this option falls.
Since the data include records from 1989, before the new system of three
plans was introduced, it is possible to compare the spending in 1989 of
those employees who elected each of the three options in 1990. Figure 8.2
does this by showing quintiles based on 1989 spending, and then looking
at which plan employees in each of those quintiles chose in 1990. So, for
example, about 17 percent of those who were in the lowest quintile in 1989
chose plan 1 in 1990. Generally, the proportion choosing plan 1 falls at the
higher percentiles of the 1989 distribution, suggesting that individuals who
spend more in 1989 are less likely to opt for the high-deductible plan in
1990. The individuals in the higher quintiles who do not choose plan 1 ap-
pear to optf or plan 2. Moving higher in the 1989 expenditure distribution,
as plan 1 enrollment falls plan 2 enrollment rises. The proportion of indi-
viduals opting for the most generous plan does not appear to change appre-
ciably across the 1989 expenditure distribution.
An ordered probit regression, relating 1990 plan choice to 1989 spend-
ing and the various demographic factors, conﬁrms that controlling for all
observables simultaneously does not appreciably alter the picture. The or-
dinal character of the dependent variable comes from the ranking of the
plans in order of increasing generosity. Table 8.4 presents estimation re-
sults. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃciento nthe indicators for 1989
expenditure quintile once again demonstrate that those individuals who
spent more in 1989 chose more generous plans in 1990, even controlling
ford e mographicsa nd family structure. In addition, the positive coeﬃ-
cients on the indicator for spouse present and the indicator for spouse and
children present suggest that an employee with a spouse was more likely
Table 8.3 Family Grouping by New Plan Chosen
Plan 1 (%) Plan 2 (%) Plan 3 (%)
Employee only 18.72 35.05 46.23
Employee and spouse 9.85 46.95 43.20
Employee, spouse, and children 8.62 43.15 48.23
Employee and children 10.29 43.24 46.57
Source: See table 8.1.










































eto choose a more generous plan, and that an employee with both spouse
and children was even more likely to elect such an option.
8.3 The Price of Insurance Coverage
The last section examined which employees chose the more generous
coverage options. In this section I consider the price that employees pay,
in the form of payroll deductions, for such a decision. I begin by consider-
ing the projections of the ﬁrm concerning the costs of the various insur-
ance plans and then translate these expenditure projections into the rela-
tive costs to the employee.
Table 8.5 shows the projections prepared by the ﬁrm of the overall cost
of the three coverage options. In other words, these ﬁgures reﬂect antici-
pated mean expenditure for family groups of each size under each of the
Table 8.4 Ordered Probit Estimation of 1990 Plan Choice
Second expenditure quintile in 1989 0.0338
(0.0284)
Third expenditure quintile in 1989 0.0831*
(0.0292)
Fourth expenditure quintile in 1989 0.2154*
(0.0305)
Fifthe xpenditure quintile 1989 0.2778*
(0.0313)
Employee aged 25–35 0.0018
(0.0363)




Male employee aged 25–35 0.2239*
(0.0454)




Spouse and children present 0.1409*
(0.0242)
Children (but not spouse) present 0.0560
(0.0309)
First cut point 0.9621
(0.0373)
Second cut point 0.3317
(0.0368)
Source: See table 8.1.
Notes: Speciﬁcation also includes ﬁve location indicators. Sample size is 16,930. Standard
errorsa re in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.plans. There are also some slight geographic adjustments in recognition of
diﬀerences in cost across the six sites. While I will incorporate these in my
calculations, the tables show only the price schedule for the largest site. In
addition to the ﬁrm’s estimates of costs, table 8.5 shows actual costs during
each of the years covered by the data as well as the annual average over
three years. The ﬁrm estimates correspond quite well to the actual costs
for the more expensive plan and for the larger family groupings. For ex-
ample, the ﬁrm estimates of average annual cost for plan 3 are $2,460,
$4,720, and $6,650 for an employee alone, employee with a single depen-
dent, and employee with multiple dependents, respectively. The corre-
sponding actual mean costs for 1990 are $2,154, $5,081, and $6,266.
Thee stimates were less accurate for lower-cost employees, either those
enrolled in plan 1 or those in plan 2 with few dependents. For these em-
ployees, the ﬁrm estimates tended to exceed the actual costs. For example,
the projected mean expenditures for plan 1 were $1,890 for a employee
alone, $3,590 for an employee with a single dependent, and $5,190 for an
employee with multiple dependents. The actual average expenditures for
1990 were $874, $1,860, and $4,370. There are two possible explanations
for these overly high estimates. Either the self-selection of healthy individ-
uals into the low cost plans was greater than anticipated, or the incentive
to spend less provided by the comparatively high deductible was more ef-
fective than anticipated.
The actual cost to the employee in payroll deductions of each of the
three insurance options can be derived from these expenditure estimates.
Theﬁ rm follows an equal subsidy pricing rule, meaning that the ﬁrm pro-
vides the same dollar value of subsidy to its employees regardless of which
plans they elect. The subsidy is set equal to 80 percent of the plan 2 aver-
agee xpenditure, so for an employee with no dependents, the subsidy is
$440. For an employee with a single dependent, the ﬁrm contribution
nearly doubles to $840, while an employee with multiple dependents re-
ceivesasubsidy of $1,218. Table 8.6 shows the relative costs of the various
coverage options after this equal-subsidy rule is implemented. The num-
bers in parentheses represent the percentage diﬀerences in payroll deduc-
tionsf or plans 1 and 3 relative to the base plan 2. Thus, plan 1 costs about
70 percent less than the base plan while plan 3 costs about 50 percent
more.
These number still do not, however, reﬂect the true costs to employees.
More generous plans bring, along with higher payroll deductions, lower
deductibles and copayments. Deductibles are satisﬁed and copayments are
made in after-tax dollars; yet the payroll deductions are essentially taken in
pretax dollars. The ﬁrm provides employees a certain number of “beneﬁt
dollars” depending on salary. With these beneﬁt dollars, an employee must
purchase coverage through one of the three health insurance plans. The
balance of these beneﬁt dollars can then be used to purchase other insur-
258 Matthew J. Eichnerance against death or disability, or they may be taken as salary, in which
case they constitute taxable income. Therefore beneﬁt dollars are essen-
tially exchangeable against after-tax dollars in two diﬀerent ways: They
canb eu sed to purchase a more comprehensive health insurance, thus re-
ducing the coinsurance payments; and they may also be directly trans-
formed into after-tax income. In either case, one of the beneﬁt dollars can
be traded against 1 after-tax dollars, where  is the tax rate. For most
of the calculations in this paper, I will assume  to be 0.3 and convert the
premiums on that basis into after-tax dollars. The resulting payroll de-
ductions are shown in table 8.7.
8.4 Attitudes toward Risk
Thirteen percent of employees choose plan 1, 45 percent opt for plan 2,
and the remaining 46 percent elect plan 3. Thus 45 percent pay about three
times the plan 1 rate and 46 percent pay about ﬁve times the plan 1 rate
to enroll in plan 3. This section examines these decisions. First, I look at
the relation between premiums and reimbursements for employees elect-
ing plans 2 and 3 during the three years of data, and calculate the net cost
of choosing the more generous coverage. Then I examine this issue in
the expected utility framework, calculating the willingness to pay for ex-
panded coverage under a set of admittedly rather restrictive assumptions.
Table 8.6 Employee Cost by Plan and Family Grouping
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3
Employee $130 $440 $700
(70%) (59%)
Employee and one dependent $230 $840 $1,360
(73%) (62%)
Employee and multiple dependents $318 $1,218 $1,778
(74%) (46%)
Source: See table 8.1.
Table 8.7 Employee After-Tax Cost by Plan and Family Grouping
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3
Employee $91 $308 $490
(70%) (59%)
Employee and one dependent $161 $588 $952
(73%) (62%)
Employee and multiple dependents $223 $853 $1,245
(74%) (46%)
Source: See table 8.1.
Choice among Employer-Provided Insurance Plans 259Suppose that all employees who elected plans 2 and 3 in 1990 had in-
stead chosen plan 1, and the money saved in payroll deductions was depos-
ited in an account. Figure 8.3 shows the distribution of balances in these
accounts after a three-year period. The mean balance is negative $57, sug-
gesting that the average plan 2 and plan 3 enrollee in fact did better by
choosing a more generous plan and paying the higher premiums. The me-
dian balance, however, is positive $277, so that over half of the plan 2 and
plan 3 enrollees would end the period with more than that amount in their
accounts. Once again assuming that 1989 expenditures may be used to
control for diﬀerential health status, ﬁgure 8.4 makes clear that while the
average employee saved by choosing plan 2 or plan 3, a substantial number
of employees would have amassed more as plan 1 enrollees. About 65 per-
cent of employees in the ﬁrst two 1989 expenditure quintiles, for example,
end the three-year period with a positive balance.
The analysis above, however, ignores at least two issues fundamental to
the problem. First, a positive or negative balance is, in itself, inconclusive
with regard to whether plan 1 represents a better choice than one of the
more generous options. If there is at least a possibility of each employee’s
ending the three-year period with a negative balance, it is the employee’s
attitude toward risk that ultimately determines the optimal choice. A sec-
ond, equally important issue relates to the fact that plan 1 not only costs
lessi np remiums and pays less in reimbursements, but also oﬀers a diﬀer-
ent schedule of incentivest ow hich enrollees in the plan presumably re-
spond. In fact, there is substantial evidence from experimental and nonex-
perimental research that the behavioral response to price incentives in the
region relevant to these calculations—that is, in the part of the distribution
between zero and several thousand dollars—is appreciable.1
To allow for both risk aversion and a behavioral response to the price
of care requires a more structured approach to the problem. The ﬁrst step
in this analysis is to think about the out-of-pocket costs an employee is
likely to face. As described in section 8.1 and shown in ﬁgure 8.5, the
three plans oﬀered by the ﬁrm each have diﬀerent piece-wise linear price
schedules, with kinks at the deductible and then again once the out-of-
pocket maximum is reached. Each employee thus ends each year on one
of the three segments. Ending the year on the ﬁrst segment implies an
out-of-pocket cost equal to expenditures. A family landing on the second
segment pays the deductible plus the copayment rate times the diﬀerence
between total expenditure and the deductible. Finally, the third segment is
populated by those employees who have reached the out-of-pocket maxi-
muma nd therefore pay no more than that amount.
I will begin by trying to model the probability that an employee with a
1. Newhouse (1993) describes an experimental approach to measuring the price response.
Eichner (1996) essentially replicates the earlier results using a nonexperimental method.










































sgiven age, gender, family grouping, and plan choice ends the year on one
particular segment of the price schedule. This task is complicated by the
fact that plan choice is surely correlated with unobservable health status.
In order to separate the incentive eﬀects of the plans from the self-selection
behaviors of those who choose each plan, I will once again use 1989 expen-
ditures as the means of controlling, however imperfectly, for diﬀerences in
unobservable health status.
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Fig. 8.4 Accumulation by 1989 expenditure quintile
Fig. 8.5 Typical nonlinear price scheduleOnce again, I will take advantage of the fact that the three segments
have obvious rankings and use the ordered probit model. I perform the
estimation by stacking all three years of data for those individuals who do
not change plans during that time period and adding year eﬀects to the
speciﬁcation. As shown in table 8.8, both the plan indicators and the 1989
expenditure-quintile indicators have the expected sign. The plan 1 indica-
tori snegative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that there is a plan 1 eﬀect that
tends to reduce expenditures. On the other hand, the positive and signiﬁ-
cant plan 3 eﬀectc a ptures the higher average spending under the more
generous plan. The indicator for the second 1989 expenditure quintile is
Table 8.8 Ordered Probit Estimation of Price Schedule Segment
Second expenditure quintile in 1989 0.0077
(0.0195)
Third expenditure quintile in 1989 0.1109*
(0.0196)
Fourth expenditure quintile in 1989 0.2790*
(0.0204)
Fifth expenditure quintile 1989 0.3776*
(0.0209)
Employee aged 25–35 0.2597*
(0.0244)




Male employee aged 25–35 0.0105
(0.0307)




Single child present 0.1082*
(0.0234)






First cut point 0.0989
(0.0281)
Second cut point 1.8670
(0.0295)
Source: See table 8.1.
Notes: Speciﬁcation also includes ﬁve location indicators. Sample size is 41,124. Standard
errorsa re in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level.
Choice among Employer-Provided Insurance Plans 263essentially zero while those for the higher quintiles are positive, increasing,
and statistically signiﬁcant.
Using the results of this estimation, it is possible to calculate a three-
point distribution for persons with a particular set of characteristics. This
distribution captures the likelihood of ending the year on each of the three
segments: below the deductible, between the deductible and out-of-pocket
limit, and above the out-of-pocket limit. Table 8.9 shows somer epresenta-
tive probability distributions for persons in the third quintile in 1989, that
is, for the median spender with a particular set of characteristics. Not sur-
prisingly, the probability of being below the deductible is greatest for each
of the representative families under plan 1, and the probability of being
below the deductible is slightly greater for each employee under plan 2 than
under plan 3. Family structure and age are important determinants of the
distribution. The probability of being below the deductible under plan 1
is 23 percentage points greater for a single male aged thirty than for a
married male aged ﬁfty with children.
To use these probability distributions to calculate the willingness of em-
ployees to pay for more insurance coverage, I apply the standard expected
utility framework developed as expounded by Arrow (1971). Suppose that
U(W) has a positive ﬁrst derivative and negative second derivative, so as
to represent the preferences of a risk-averse employee. Under a particular
insurance plan, out-of-pocket losses are assumed to follow some distribu-
tion fL(1). Thus the expected utility can be written
UM L P UM l P f ld
L
L () ( ) ( ) , −− = − − ∫
where M is income and P is the premium associated with the particular
insurance plan.
Suppose such a calculation is made for a particular insurance plan. One
Table 8.9 Representative Probability Distributions
Between At or Above
Below Deductible Out-of-
Deductible and Limit Pocket Limit
Male age ﬁfty, with spouse Plan 1 0.5885 0.3972 0.0143
and children Plan 2 0.2396 0.6563 0.1041
Plan 3 0.2188 0.6642 0.1170
Male age thirty, without Plan 1 0.8132 0.1847 0.0021
spouse Plan 2 0.4506 0.5166 0.0327
Plan 3 0.3242 0.6103 0.0655
Male age thirty-ﬁve, with Plan 1 0.7145 0.2798 0.0057
spouse Plan 2 0.3536 0.5905 0.0558
Plan 3 0.2535 0.6502 0.0963
Source: See table 8.1
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where gt is the density function describing the possible losses under the
alternative plan. In other words, at what premium P*i st h eutility the
same under both plans?
Before I can make such a calculation, I need explicitly to recognize that
the three-point distributions estimated above are only approximations to
the continuous distributions. In order to calculate the premiums that leave
the employees indiﬀerent, I need to assign losses to each of the three mass
points. I do this by assigning to each segment the mean loss for those
employees located on the segment, conditional on plan choice and family
grouping. The explicit form of the utility function I assume to be constant
relative to risk aversion:






Table 8.10 shows calculated and actual plan premiums for several repre-
sentative employees. The utility function parameter  is set equal to 3.5,
although the calculations are insensitive to other choices. The table reveals
that plan 1 is available to all employees at a discount. In other words, the
ﬁfty-year-old male with a wife and children would be indiﬀerent between
Table 8.10 Premiums Calculated to Preserve Indiﬀerence with Plan 2
Income $30,000 $50,000 $70,000
Plan 1 $379 $406 $417
($223) ($223) ($223)
Plan 2 ($853) ($853) ($853)
Male age ﬁfty, with spouse Plan 3 $1,318 $1,309 $1,305
and children ($1,244) ($1,244) ($1,244)
Plan 1 $228 $232 $234
($91) ($91) ($91)
Plan 2 ($308) ($308) ($308)
Male age thirty, without Plan 3 $407 $406 $406
spouse ($490) ($490) ($490)
Plan 1 $243 $266 $275
($161) ($161) ($161)
Plan 2 ($588) ($588) ($588)
Male age thirty-ﬁve, with Plan 3 $888 $882 $880
spouse ($952) ($952) ($952)
Source: See table 8.1.
Note: Actual premiums in parentheses.
Choice among Employer-Provided Insurance Plans 265plans 1 and 2 if plan 1 were priced at $379. It is, in fact, available at the
price of $223. Except for the ﬁfty-year-old man with a wife and children,
all employees pay more in premiums for the most generous option than the
amount that the utility calculations suggest would leave them indiﬀerent
between plan 3 and plan 2. For example, the single male is indiﬀerent
between plans 2 and 3 if plan 3 can be had for $407. In fact, it is priced
at $490.
8.5 Movement between Plans
Of the 19,930 employees in the sample, 3,224 are observed in more than
one plan during the 1990–92 time period. In this section, I examine how
these employees who switch plans diﬀer in demographic characteristics
and spending from those who remain in single plans during the three-
year period.
Table 8.11 shows the observed transitions between plans. Over half of
the movement consists of transfers from plan 3 to plan 2. Another 19
percent of those who switch move from plan 2 to plan 3. Movement into
and out of plan 1 is much less common but more symmetrical.
Table 8.12 compares the demographic characteristics of employees who
switch plans with the demographic characteristics of those who do not
transfer during the 1990–92 period. With regard to age and gender, the
switchers and stayers are essentially indistinguishable. However, employees
with spouses and children are substantially more likely to switch plans
than are single employees.
In spending patterns, the switchers and stayers are also dramatically
diﬀerent. Table 8.13 shows a series of censored regressions of log expendi-
tures on an indicator for switching plans. The ﬁrst column considers the
relation between expenditures in 1990 and whether a transfer took place
between 1990 and 1991. The positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
ciento f2.03 suggests that those who switched plans spent about twice as
much in 1990 as those who never switched plans. The second column tells
Table 8.11 Movement between Plans
New Plan Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3
Old plan
Plan 1 — 201 88
(8.14%) (3.56%)
Plan 2 229 — 486
(9.28%) (19.68)
Plan 3 107 1,358 —
(4.33%) (55.00%)
Source: See table 8.1.
266 Matthew J. Eichneras imilar story with regard to 1991 expenditures and whether an employee
chose a new plan in 1992. Individuals who switched plans spent more in
their old plans during the year preceding the switch. The indicator in the
speciﬁcation shown in column (3) captures the eﬀecto n1990 expenditures
ofaplan switch any time during the 1990–92 period. Once again, the co-
eﬃcienti sp ositive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Thef o urth column of table 8.13 considers spending once an employee
has entered a new plan. The positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on the indicator suggests that individuals also spend more after arriving
in a new plan than do their colleagues who choose not to transfer. The
ﬁfth column reveals a similar picture for employees whot ransferred at the
start of 1992. The speciﬁcation in column (6) provides a backward look at
spending and reveals that those who switched plans in either 1991 or 1992
spent over twice as much in 1992 as their colleagues who did not switch.
The ﬁnal two columns show that the higher expenditures associated
with plan-changers do trail oﬀ with time. The seventh column shows re-
gression of 1990 expenditures on a indicator for having selected a new plan
at the start of 1992. The eighth column similarly relates spending in 1992
with a change in plans at the start of 1991. In these last two regressions,
the coeﬃciento nthe indicator is appreciably smaller, although still posi-
tive and signiﬁcant.
8.6 Summary
This paper presents some basic evidence on how employees choose
health insurance coverage from a menu of options. There is some evidence
that they hesitate to choose low-deductible plans, even though these may
be oﬀered at a discount to a price that might leave them indiﬀerent be-
tween the high-deductible plan and other, more generous coverage options.
This conclusion, however, is based on adherence to a standard expected
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Table 8.12 Characteristics of Switchers and Stayers
Stayers (%) Switchers (%)
Age 25–34 41.60 38.09
Age 35–44 30.96 31.73
Age 45–55 27.44 30.18
Male 39.22 41.00
Employee only 38.99 23.95
Employee and spouse 18.17 19.73
Employee, spouse, and children 31.55 43.70
Employee and children (without
spouse) 11.29 12.62

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.utility approach, which might prove an inadequate framework for evaluat-
ing employee willingness to bear risk. In addition, the conclusions are no
doubt sensitive to how one views the likelihood of persistent losses over a
comparatively long time period. The probability of such outcomes can be
assessed using the empirical approach taken by Eichner, McClellan, and
Wise (1997). Applying this technique to the issue of plan choice is a future
goal of this work.
In addition, the paper examines evidence concerning those employees
whoe lect to change plans voluntarily. This group consists disproportion-
ately of larger family groupings, which tend to move between the two more
generous coverage options. Movement between plans seems to be associ-
ated with higher expenditures both before and after the move.
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